The economic literature has recognized since some time ago that inequality and polarization are two di¤erent concepts. As in the case of inequality, the measurement of polarization was initially developed in the context of a continuous dimension which de…ned the "closeness" of the characteristics of individuals and clusters. However, in many important dimensions, like ethnicity, there are not available measures of distance across ethnic groups. Additionally, when it comes to ethnicity individuals are mostly interested in the dichotomous perception "we versus they". In this paper we analyze the theoretical properties of a measure of polarization based on classi…cations (discrete polarization) instead of continuous distances across groups. We also show that, opposite to some recent empirical applications of discrete polarization, the range of suitable parameters of the original index is not correct for the measurement of polarization without distances. The second part of the paper presents an application of the index of discrete ethnic polarization to the explanation of genocides.
"In the twentieth century, genocides and state mass murder have killed more people than have all wars". Institute for the Study of Genocide. International Association of Genocide Scholars.
Introduction
The concept of polarization has been used frequently in political science and economics, although its precise conceptualization has turned to be evasive and di¢ cult. For this reason many authors used it in a very imprecise, and sometimes con ‡icting, fashion. The contributions of Esteban and Ray (1994) and Wolfson (1994) 1 represent the …rst attempts to provide a precise de…nition of polarization. These recent de…nitions explain why the empirical measurement of di¤erent dimensions of polarization is a very recent phenomenon, opposite to the somehow related concept of inequality which has generated thousands of contributions on measurement.
The concept of polarization was initially developed in the context of a continuous dimension, in particular income, which de…ned the "closeness" of the characteristics of the individuals. Esteban and Ray (1994) present the properties of a precise axiomatization of a class of polarization measures based on distances in the real line 2 . However, in many important dimensions (like ethnicity or religion), there is no information on a continuous variable to measure distances across groups, or the "distances" have to be discretize, and there is no precise information on the latent variable used for the discretization. In this paper we introduce the theoretical properties of a class of measures of discrete polarization based on classi…cations instead of continuous distances. We also show that it is empirically quite di¤erent from the analogous inequality measure (fractionalization). There are many reasons that favor the use of a discrete metric to construct the index of ethnic o religious polarization 3 . First, there are no measures of distance across ethnic (religious) groups available and generally accepted 4 . The measure of the "distance"across ethnic groups is much more controversial than the identi…cation of the list of ethnic groups. Second, the measurement of distances across 1 In fact Wolfson (1994) emphasizes the di¤erence between polarization and inequality and develops a theoretical measure of the former that can be interpreted using the Lorenz curve. 2 Empirical applications of this measure can be found in Gradin (2000) and Duclos, Esteban and Ray (2004) . Anderson (2004) considers measures of polarization in terms of stochastic dominance. Keefer and Knack (2002) have argued that income based measures of polarization are similar to their corresponding Gini coe¢ cients 3 This comment also applies to many other characteristics that cannot be ordered in the real line (country of birth, immigration status, etc.). 4 Fearon (2003) presents a proposal to measure "cultural fractionalization" based on the calculation of resemblance factors.
groups may generate a larger measurement error than the "belong/does not belong to" criterion.
Third, if the distance across groups is measured using the strength of the sentiment of identity or political relevance then there is an important endogeneity problem. At the end we will be explaining con ‡ict using con ‡ict as the explanatory variable, since the sentiment of identity is high when there is con ‡ict. Fourth, as argued by Duclos, Esteban and Ray (2004) , "there are many interesting instances in which individuals are interested only in the dichotomous perception Us/They." We believe the case of ethnic (religious) groups is a important example of this situation. Finally, the "distance" across groups is most likely a function of polarization. It is reasonable to argue that in a very polarized society the distance across groups will be large, in the sense of generating a strong sentiment of identity and opposition to the other groups. If this is the case the index of discrete polarization is also capturing, in a way, distances.
Some authors 5 have applied the measure of Esteban and Ray (1994) to data on groups, without information on distances, assuming that the same properties of the original measure extend to the "belong-do not belong"situation. The …rst objetive of this paper is to emphasize the fact that with discrete distances the mechanic application of the Esteban and Ray polarization index is not correct.
We show that some properties of discrete polarization are di¤erent from the polarization measure in
Esteban and Ray (1994) 6 . This is not a minor point since the empirical calculation of any the index of discrete polarization relies heavely on the choice of the parameter in the set of feasible degrees of polarization sensitivity.
The second part of the paper analyzes the e¤ect of discrete ethnic polarization on the probability of genocides. Recently, many academic economist have turned to the study of con ‡ict and its main determinants. In empirical applications, civil wars are the most frequently variable used to proxy for con ‡ict. However, genocides, which is one of the most violent and bloody forms of social violence, have not receive much attention, even though they result in more deaths than civil wars. Since
World War II nearly 50 genocides and political mass murder have happened and these episodes have cost the lives of at least 12 million combatants, and as many 22 million noncombatants. Those are more than all the victims of internal and international wars since 1945 7 . We use data on genocides because, in principle, they are more appropriate to test the relevance of (ethnic) polarization for the analysis of extreme violence.
Genocides are characterized by the extermination of members of a target group, a phenomena 5 For instance Aghion et al. (2004) , Collier and Hoe-er (2004), or Alesina et al.(2003) . 6 From now on ER94. 7 See the State Failure Task Force.
that not always happens during a civil war. Since ethnic disputes are usually very violent it is reasonable to infer that ethnicity may have an important e¤ect on the probability of genocides.
However, recent papers on the determinants of genocides, and civil wars in general, have found no evidence of the e¤ect of ethnic fractionalization 8 . These …ndings have led some researchers to dismiss ethnicity as a potential source of extreme violence, in clear contrast with traditional theories.
However, the properties of discrete polarization discussed in this paper suggest that the higher is the level of violence the more relevant is the e¤ect of ethnic polarization. In this paper we …nd that ethnic heterogeneity is a statistically signi…cant determinant of the probability of a genocide if we use an index of discrete ethnic polarization instead of ethnic fractionalization. We also …nd that ethnic polarization increases more the likelihood of genocides than the probability of a civil war.
A particular index of the general family of discrete polarization measures, the RQ, was used by Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005) in their empirical study of the causes of civil wars. The …nal message of that paper was strictly empirical: the RQ index is a signi…cant explanatory variable for the incidence of civil wars. There was no theoretical justi…cation for the use of that particular index besides a di¤use claim of analogy with the index of Esteban and Ray (1994) without distances. This new paper is basically a theoretical piece, where we present three basic contributions: …rst of all,
we provide a precise mathematical characterization of a class of discrete polarization measures, and characterize theoretically the properties of the particular index (RQ) that we use in the AER paper.
Secondly, we prove that the only polarization sensitivity compatible with reasonable properties of polarization is = 1. We consider this to be an important contribution since many authors (as we mentioned before) have wrongly understood that they can use any degree of polarization sensitivity compatible with the index of Esteban and Ray (1994), (0-1.6], to construct indices of discrete polarization. Finally, as we argue in the theory part, discrete polarization should be more relevant the more intense is the con ‡ict. Genocides are a perfect example since they represent the most violent form of con ‡ict. The third original contribution of this paper is to show that the contribution of ethnic polarization to the likelihood of a con ‡ict increases with the intensity of the con ‡ict.
The outline of the paper is the following. Section 2 introduces the concept of discrete polarization and discusses its theoretical properties. Section 3 analyzes the empirical performance of discrete ethnic polarization in the explanation of genocides. Section 4 concludes.
A class of discrete polarization measures
Traditionally the study of the impact of ethnicity on growth or civil wars has rested on the construction of indices of fractionalization, even though most of the theories refer to "polarized societies" 9 .
Several authors have interpreted the …nding of a negative relationship between ethnic fractionalization and growth as evidence of a high probability of con ‡ict in very heterogeneous societies.
However, the empirical evidence on the direct relationship between fractionalization and civil wars is at most very weak 10 . We argue that the reason why ethnicity does not seem to have any impact on con ‡ict is the use of the index of fractionalization. Reynal-Querol (2002) proposed an index of ethnic heterogeneity, RQ, that tried to capture polarization instead of fractionalization
The original purpose of this index was to capture how far is the distribution of the ethnic groups from the (1/2,0,0,...0,1/2) distribution (bipolar), which represents the highest level of polarization 11 .
There was no analysis of theoretical properties or implications. Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005) show that the RQ index was somehow related with the index of polarization of ER94. However, the argument based on certain analogy between the RQ index and the ER94 index is quite ad-hoc.
Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005) do not discuss any property of the index nor its relationship with the general class of discrete polarization measures. In fact, Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005) is basically an empirical paper which shows that if we measure ethnic heterogeneity in terms of bipolarity then ethnicity is key to explain the probability of civil wars.
One of the objectives of our current paper is to provide a theoretical foundation to the family of discrete polarization measures given the lack of development of the theory. ER94 provide a particular conceptualization for polarization, emphasizing the di¤erence between inequality and polarization.
They argue that there are "signi…cant problems concerning racial, religious, tribal and nationalistic con ‡ict which clearly have more to do with the clustering of attributes than with the inequality of their distribution over the population." What do they mean by polarization? A population of individuals may be grouped according to some vector of characteristics into "clusters" such that each cluster is similar in terms of the attributes of its members, but di¤erent clusters have members with "dissimilar"attributes. Such a society is polarized even though the measurement of inequality 9 Easterly and Levine (1997). could be low. ER94 use the following example: suppose that initially the population is uniformly distributed over the deciles of income. Suppose that we collapse the distribution in two groups of equal size in deciles 3 and 8. Polarization has increased since the "middle class" has disappeared and group identity is stronger in the second situation. However inequality, measured by the Gini index or by any other inequality measure, has decreased. 12 By using three axioms, Esteban and Ray (1994) narrow down the class of allowable polarization measures to only one measure, P , with the following form
for some constants k > 0 and 2 (0; ] where ' 1:6. When = 0 13 and k = 1 this polarization measure is precisely the Gini coe¢ cient. Therefore the fact that the share of each group is raised to the 1 + power, which exceeds one, is what makes the polarization measure signi…cantly di¤erent from inequality measures. The parameter can be treated as the degree of "polarization sensitivity."
In the case of ethnic diversity the identity of the groups is less controversial than the "distance" between di¤erent ethnic groups, which is much more di¢ cult to measure than income or wealth.
Then, it is reasonable to treat the "distance" across groups, (:; :); as generated by a discrete metric
(1-0). If we want to measure ethnic diversity, the distance between ethnic groups may be a very di¢ cult concept to measure. If we consider the criteria "belongs" or "does not belong" to an ethnic (religious) group, instead of the distance, then we should substitute the Euclidean metric (y i ; y j ) = jy i y j j, by a discrete metric
In addition, any classi…cation of ethnic groups implies a criterion to transform the di¤erences of the characteristics of ethnic groups into a discrete decision rule (for instances, same family-di¤erent family). For example, following the classi…cation of the World Christian Encyclopedia, the ethnic subgroup of the Luba, the Mongo and the Nguni belong to the Bantu ethnolinguistic group. The Akan, the Edo and the Ewe belong to the Kwa ethnolinguistic group. This implies that the "cultural distance" (de…ned informally by the Encyclopedia) between the subgroups of the Bantu group is 1 2 This result does not imply that polarization and inequality have always a negative relationship. 1 3 Strictly speaking for = 0 this is not an index of polarization.
smaller than the di¤erence between one subgroups of the Bantu family and one of the Kwa family.
In terms of a discrete metric, if we use the family classi…cation as the base for the di¤erence across groups, this means that the subgroup of the Bantu family are inside the ball of radius r that de…nes the discrete metric while the subgroups in the family Kwa are outside that ball. Therefore, any classi…cation involves implicitly a concept and a measure of "distance" that is discretized.
The class of indeces of discrete polarization, DP; can be described as
which depends on the values of the parameters and k: 14 .
Embedding a discrete metric into ER's polarization measure P alters the original formulation of the index as a polarization measure. It is known that the discrete metric and the Euclidean metric are not equivalent in R. The de…nition of polarization as a concept closely related to social tensions implies several characteristics. ER94 de…ne the conditions imposed by polarization using the interaction between changes in the euclidean distance of groups (for instance in terms of income) and their relative size. We are 1 4 By analogy, what we call a discrete Gini index is a discrete polarization measure with = 0 and k = 1 (also called index of fractionalization or FRAC): We distinguish FRAC (DP (0; k)) from the general discrete polarization (DP ( > 0; k)) even though the earlier is a particular case of the DP family. As we argued before the fact that > 0 is the basic attraction of polarization measures versus inequality indices. 1 5 Notice that this is somehow di¤erent from the original objective of Esteban and Ray (1994) . They characterize the general form of a polarization measure in a particular family using several axioms. This implies a limit for the parameter that cannot be larger than 1.6, but also a special form for any polarization measure. Our objective in this section is to check if the basic properties of polarization are satis…ed by what we call discrete polarization.
However we are not claiming that the DP index is the only possible form for a polarization measure based on discrete distances.
going to rede…ne those conditions only in terms of groups size, since we are not using distances across groups. We work with three groups, since this is the minimum number of groups that make the measure of polarization di¤erent from the index of fractionalization. An index of discrete polarization should have basically two properties. The …rst property (PR1) is that if we join the two smallest groups polarization should increase. 16 The second property (PR2) is that any new distribution formed by shifting probability mass from one group equally to the other two groups must increase polarization. 17 . We can show formally that the only DP measure that satis…es the two properties exposed above is the one with a value of = 1: Let's restate these two properties 18 formally and derive the implications with respect to the values of : De…ne 1 = p; 2 = q and 3 = r.
Property 1:
If there are three groups of sizes, p, q, and r, and p > q and q r, then if we merge the two smallest groups into a new group, e q, the new distribution is more polarized than the original one.
That is, P OL(p; q; r) < P OL(p; e q) where e q = q + r 19 :
We de…ne P OL(x) as the proper index of polarization when x = (p; q; r): Property 1 states that when we join the two smallest groups the index of polarization should increase. As we argued before we need 1 to have a DP measure that satis…es property 1. We can prove that this is the case for any number of groups and not only three. Another property of polarization measures is that they attain their maximum at a bipolar symmetric distribution. We can generalize the result using the following lemma.
Lemma 1: The DP ( ; k) index attains its maximum at a bipolar symmetric distribution if 1.
(see proof in Appendix I).
Property 2 can be stated formally in the following way. 1 6 This property corresponds basically with axiom 1 and 2 in Esteban and Ray (1994). 1 7 This is the analog for discrete distances of axiom 3 in ER94. 1 8 Notice that, in our case, we do not use the term "axiom" since we are not interested in describing and narrowing down a general class of discrete polarization measures. We only want to check if the DP measure proposed in this paper satis…es those properties. 1 9 This property is the analog to axioms 1 and 2 in ER94.
Property 2: Assume that there are three groups of sizes p,q,p. Then if we shift mass from the q group equally to the other two groups, polarization increases. That is, P OL(p; q; p) < P OL(p + x; q 2x; p + x):
20
Theorem 3: The only DP ( ; k) measure that satisfy property 2 for any distribution is the one such that = 1 (see proof in Appendix I).
Corollary: The only family of DP measures that satis…es properties 1 and 2 is the one with
If we …x = 1; and choose k = 4 (which makes the range of the index DP(1,k) to lie between 0 and 1) then we obtain the RQ index 
where i is the proportion of people that belong to the ethnic group i and N is the number of groups.
This index has a simple interpretation as the probability that two randomly selected individuals from a given country will not belong to the same ethnic group and it increases monotonically with the number of groups. By contrast, the RQ index reaches a maximum when there are two groups. 21 The simplest way to look at the implications of di¤erent choices of parameters for the discrete polarization measures is to describe the shape of di¤erent surfaces using several examples. This property corresponds to axiom 3 in ER94. 2 1 Certainly the number of groups that maximize con ‡ict in the context of a rent seeking contest is model speci…c.
However the original justi…cation for polarization measures (Esteban and Ray 1994) is to produce an index that obtains a maximum for the distribution (1/2, 0, 0, ...., 0, 1/2). 2 2 The parameter k, which is just a scale factor, is …xed to 4 in all the cases. We can see more clearly this e¤ect in …gure 7 where we depict the two dimensional plane generated by cutting the surfaces along the line from Z 0 to Z 1 : The X-axis represents the equal-sized transfer from group 2 to groups 1 and 3. The Y-axis represents the value of the index. For = 0:5 we can see that the index increases until a transfer of 1/3 and then decreases. For = 1:5 we see that the index increases and then decreases, hitting a local minimum at 1/3 and increasing again after that point. Finally for = 1 we see that the index increases over the whole range with an in ‡ection point at a transfer equal to 1/3. Therefore from this informal discussion of four examples we see that only when = 1; which is equivalent to the RQ index, the discrete polarization measure satis…es both properties.
The previous results show that the range of suitable values of polarization sensitivity in a measure based on Euclidean distances cannot be translated directly to a measure based on discrete distances. groups. Genocides and politicides are di¤erent to state repression and terror. In cases of state terror authorities arrest, persecute or execute a few members in ways designed to terrorize the majority of the group into passivity or acquiescence.
In the case of genocide, authorities physically exterminate enough (not necessarily all) members of a target group so that it can no longer pose any conceivable threat to their rule or interests.
Because genocide involves frequently the confrontation of ethnic, religious or nationalistic groups, we think it is a specially important case for the study of the relationship between con ‡ict and alternative measures of ethnic diversity.
The literature that analyses the determinants of genocides is scarce. Recently, Har¤ (2003) constructed a dataset on genocides and politicides, as the principal investigator of the State Failure Task Force (genocide/politicide project) and tested a structural model of the antecedents of genocide and politicide. Har¤ (2003) identi…es six causal factors and test, in particular, the hypothesis that "the greater the ethnic and religious diversity, the greater the likelihood that communal identity will lead to mobilization and, if con ‡ict is protracted, prompt elite decisions to eliminate the group basis of actual or potential challenges". However, she …nds no empirical evidence to support this Theoretical models suggest that the risk of con ‡ict is high when society is divided into two large groups of similar size. Moreover, Horowitz (1985) argues that the relationship between ethnic diversity and violence is not monotonic: there is less violence in highly homogeneous and highly heterogeneous societies, and more con ‡icts in societies where a large ethnic minority faces an ethnic majority. If this is so then an index of polarization should capture better the likelihood of genocides than an index of fractionalization.
Caselli and Coleman (2006) have recently proposed a theory of ethnic con ‡ict were they argue that coalitions formed along ethnic lines compete for the economy's resources. Ethnicity enforces coalition membership. They claim, at least in the initial working paper version of the paper, that ethnic dominance could be an important factor in con ‡icts. The empirical results reported by Collier (2001) seems to indicate that a good operational de…nition of dominance implies a group that represents between 45% and 90% of the population. However, Collier and Hoe-er (2004) …nd that dominance, de…ned as mentioned before, has only a weak positive e¤ect on the onset of civil wars. Ethnic dominance, or the existence of a large ethnic group, is related with ethnic polarization although it does not capture some subtle aspects. Dominance implies the existence of a large group.
A high degree of polarization captures the idea of a large majority versus a large minority. Therefore, dominance is, in general, a necesary condition for a high degree of polarization but it is not su¢ cient.
Data and basic speci…cation
In this section we present the estimation of a logit model for Mountains are another dimension of opportunity since this terrain could provide a safe haven for rebels. Long distances from the center of the state's power also favors the incidence of con ‡ict, specially if there is a natural frontier between them, like a sea or other countries. Collier and Hoe-er (2004) point out that the existence of natural resources provide an opportunity for rebellion since these resources can be used to …nance the war and increases the payo¤ if victory is achieved.
We are going to emphasize the role of ethnic divisions. Our hypothesis is that ethnic polarization will play a more important role in the explanation of genocides than in civil wars. We are going to use also the concept of ethnic dominance as characterized by Collier (2001 Therefore the explanatory variables for the core speci…cation of the incidence of genocide include the log of real GDP per capita in the initial year (LGDPC), the log of the population at the beginning of the period (LPOP), primary exports (PRMEXP), mountains (MOUNTAINS), noncontiguous states (NONCONT), and the level of democracy (DEMOCRACY) 28 . Using this core speci…cation we check the empirical performance of indices of ethnic fractionalization (ETHFRAC), polarization (ETHPOL) and dominance (ETHDOM). Table 1 presents the basic statistics for these variables, separating the sample by geographical regions and the aggregated results. Table 1 also includes the traditional ELF indicator of ethnolinguistic fractionalization used by Mauro (1995) . Ethnic polarization and ethnic dominance are the highest in Latin America. However, it is interesting to notice that ethnic dominance has a much larger range than ethnic polarization. It is also interesting to point out that while the average degree of polarization of Sub-Saharan Africa is higher than the overall average, the opposite happens in the case of ethnic dominance. The highest degree of ethnic fractionalization (either using the ETHFRAC variable or ELF) corresponds to Sub-Saharan Africa.
This result is common to all the literature on ethnic fractionalization starting with Easterly and Levine (1997). Table 2 present the correlations across the alternative indices of ethnic heterogeneity. It also 2 7 This is the basic source of data on ethnic heterogeneity of Alesina et al. (2003) . 2 8 Appendix III describes the source of each of these variables. polarization and fractionalization is negative for countries over the median of the degree of fractionalization, and it is even more negative the higher is the percentile that de…nes the high level group.
These results are not a surprise given the properties of discrete polarization that we discuss in the theoretical part of the paper. The correlation between polarization and dominance as a funtion of the degree (high or low) of fractionalization, is not monotonic: it is small for the countries over the percentile 25, but the highest degree corresponds to countries over the median and not to the sample of countries over the percentile 75. Table 3 reports the results of the estimation of the basic speci…cation obtained using ethnic fractionalization and ethnic polarization measures 29 . Column 1 shows that ethnic fractionalization has no e¤ect on genocides, con…rming results from previous research. This indicates that highly fragmented societies have no higher risk of su¤ering a genocide than homogeneous societies. However, this does not mean that ethnicity does not matter for explaining genocides. If we substitute the index of ethnic fractionalization by the index of ethnic polarization we …nd a positive and statistically signi…cant e¤ect on the incidence of genocide, which is robust to the inclusion of the other typical controls on the core speci…cation. Column 2 shows this result. Moreover, when including both measures together (column 3), we …nd that ethnic fractionalization has no e¤ect while ethnic polarization has a positive and signi…cant e¤ect on the incidence of genocides/politicides. The results are mostly unchanged if we include regional dummies (columns 4-7). Therefore, ethnic heterogeneity, measured as ethnic polarization, is important for the explanation of the likelihood of genocides. Moving from social homogeneity (one group or polarization equal to 0) to the highest degree of polarization (two groups of equal size or the index equal to 1) increases the probability of a genocide in 7 percentage points. If the polarization index increases one standard deviation (0.24) from the average (0.51) the probability of genocide increases in 1.7 percentage points.
Ethnic heterogeneity and the incidence of genocides
The State Failure Project (SFP) includes together genocides and politicides. In many situations genocides and politicides are part of the same process, mainly because ethnic division are re ‡ected in political parties. In order to separate the cases that are purely politicides, meaning that the main divisions are not ethnic, religious, racial or nationalistic, we use the information in Har¤ (2003) .
Among all the genocides/politicides in our sample, the SFP lists two cases as politicides: Chile and El Salvador. We test the robustness of our results excluding these two countries. Columns 1 to 3 of Table 4 corroborate the …ndings of Table 3 . Once the two pure politicides are excluded the coe¢ cient on ethnic polarization increases. The results are qualitative identical if we add as regressors the regional dummies.
The majority of the genocides and politicides coded by SFP took place during the curse of an ethnic civil war, as de…ned by SFP. Very few episodes are consider genocides/politicides with no civil war. We test the sensitivity of the results to the exclusion of the genocides/politicides that were not considered a civil war. Table 5 shows that ethnic fractionalization has no signi…cant e¤ect on genocides associated to civil wars. However, if instead of fractionalization we include ethnic polarization, this variable has a positive and signi…cant e¤ect on the incidence of civil war (column 2). If we include both measures (column 3), we …nd that only polarization has a statistically signi…cant e¤ect on genocides. The results are unchanged if we include in the regression the regional dummies.
We also analyze whether the results presented previously are robust to the exclusion of some geographical regions. Table 6 considers the estimation of the basic speci…cation eliminating, in sequential steps, Sub-Saharan African countries, Latin American countries and countries of Asia.
The results indicate that ethnic polarization has a positive and signi…cant e¤ect on genocide, even in the presence of ethnic fractionalization, and even when the genocide is part of an ongoing civil war. The statistical signi…cance of ethnic polarization is robust to all these di¤erent subsamples. Table 7 includes in the basic regression the ethnic dominance variable. Column 1 shows that ethnic dominance is not statistically signi…cant to explain the incidence of genocides at the usual level of signi…cance. Column 2 shows that when dominance and polarization are included together then none of them is statisticaly signi…cant. However, there are several variables that are not signi…cant and some authors do not consider in the basic speci…cation of the incidence of civil wars: the proportion of mountains and noncontinguous areas and the size of primary exports. Since these variables are never statistically signi…cant we run the regressions without them. In those speci…cations ethnic polarization is statistically signi…cant (at least in some speci…cation) while ethnic dominance is not signi…cant.
Ethnic heterogeneity and highly-death, intermediate and minor civil wars
Genocide and politicide are an extreme form of civil con ‡icts. Given our previous discussion, it seems reasonable to expect that the e¤ect of ethnic polarization on the probability of a con ‡ict is reduced the less intense is the con ‡ict. In order to test this hypothesis, we need a classi…cation of civil wars depending on its intensity. There is no doubt that genocide and politicide are the most violent con ‡icts. Civil wars can be classi…ed depending of their intensity in terms of the number of deaths.
The dataset on civil wars of Uppsala/PRIO (Peace Research Institute of Oslo) is the most widely used data on civil wars. Uppsala/PRIO de…nes an armed con ‡ict as a contested incompatibility that concerns government and/or territory where the use of armed force between two parties, of which at least one is the government of a state, results in at least 25 battle related deaths. We consider only civil war con ‡ict (type 3 and 4 from Uppsala/PRIO classi…cation), excluding or interstate war.
Uppsala/PRIO distinguish three types of con ‡icts depending on the number of deaths:
-Minor armed con ‡ict: at least 25 battle-related deaths per year and fewer than 1000 battlerelated deaths during the course of the con ‡ict.
-Intermediate Armed Con ‡ict: At least 25 battle-related deaths per year and an accumulated total of at least 1000 deaths, but fewer than 1000 per year.
-War: At least 1000 battle-related deaths per year. 
Conclusions
The economic literature has recognized since some time ago that inequality and polarization are two di¤erent concepts. As in the case of inequality, the measurement of polarization was initially developed in the context of a continuous dimension, in particular income, which de…ned the "closeness" of the characteristics of individuals and clusters. Esteban and Ray (1994) present the properties of a precise axiomatization of a class of polarization measures based on distances in the real line.
However, in many important dimensions (like ethnicity or religion), there is no information on a continuous variable to measure distances across groups. In addition, if there was such a proxy for "ethnic distances", that measure would be much more controversial than the identi…cation of the list of ethnic groups. Finally, in many instances, and ethnicity is one of them, individuals are only interested in the dichotomous perception "we versus they". For these reasons we analyze in this paper the theoretical properties of a measure of polarization based on classi…cations instead of continuous distances across groups. We show that the range of parameter values suitable for this measure of discrete polarization is di¤erent from the ones in the original polarization measure of Esteban and Ray (1994) . This is important since some recent papers have constructed measures of polarization using data on groups, without information on distances, assuming that the range of suitable parameters of the original index can be directly applied to discrete polarization.
The second part of the paper presents an application of the index of discrete ethnic polarization to the explanation of genocides. Most of the recent papers on the determinants of civil wars and genocides fail to …nd any signi…cant e¤ect for ethnic heterogeneity, measured as fractionalization.
However, Horowitz (1985) argues that the relationship between ethnic diversity and violence is not monotonic: there is less violence in highly homogeneous and highly heterogeneous societies, and more con ‡icts in societies where a large ethnic minority faces an ethnic majority. If this is so then an index of polarization should capture better the likelihood of genocides than an index of fractionalization. We argue that the use of ethnic fractionalization instead of an index of polarization is the main reason for the failure to …nd a signi…cant e¤ect of ethnic heterogeneity on the probability of genocides. The empirical results support this interpretation.
APPENDIX I.
PROOFS Proof of Theorem 1:
Proof of su¢ ciency:
The general discrete polarization index can be written as
For the three point distribution (p; q; r) the discrete polarization measure is DP ( ; k) (p;q;r) = 1 pk(
For the alternative distribution (p; e q) the DP index is DP ( ; k) (p;e q) = 1 pk(
where q + r = e q Therefore DP ( ; k) (p;e q) DP ( ; k) (p;q;r) = qk(
The …rst derivative of this function is
Notice that h 0 ( ) = 0 when = 1+ : Evaluating at the …rst derivative we obtain that h( ) is a strictly increasing for all > and a strictly decreasing function for all < .
We can write the di¤erence in DP when we merge two small groups in function of h(:) as
We want to show that if 1 then h(q) > h(e q) and h(r) > h(e q) for all q; r < In principle we should analyze two possible cases: when the merge results in a group that is smaller than the original largest group (e q p) and when the merge of the smallest groups is large than the originally largest group (e q >p).
In this case q + r = e q 1 2 : and r q < Therefore for h being strictly decreasing for all q; r 1=2, implies that the DP index has to satisfy property 1 if 1:
In this case the minimum value for p is, p = ". Notice that now q and r can not be any value between (0; 2 3 ), otherwise would violate the assumption that q; r < p. Therefore, the maximum value for q and r is, q = ". This is problematic because we don't need that h be decreasing for . Now for each value of e q;which means a value for p, there is a possible maximum value for q, which in the limit is p. Therefore what we need to show is that h(max q) > h(p) h(e q),
We have to show therefore, that h(max q) > h(p) h(e q) in all the rage of e q 2 [ Notice that as e q decrease, then p increases, and then the range of possible q also increases, and therefore in the limit the maximum q = p, increases. Therefore, If the following inequality h(
") is satis…ed for all ", means that when e q > p, then property 1 is satis…ed.
So we look which families of DP measures satisfy this inequality:
" 1]
i Therefore in order this inequality be satis…ed for all values of " we need that 1. It would also be true for r, given that r q 1 2 , and we have shown that h is decreasing function of 1 2 . Therefore, DP ( ; k) (pe q) DP ( ; k) (p;q;r) if 1
Proof of necessity:
By contradiction. We can show that if < 1, then there always exist a distribution of p; q; r such that the polarization after merging the two smallest groups is smaller than the original, that is to say DP ( ; k) (pe q) < DP ( ; k) (p;q;r) :
Consider the case such that q = r: Therefore e q = 2q.
Let's now compute,
We want to show that for < 1, there always exist a set of q 2 [q ;
Notice that if q = r then q < (1 2q) evaluated at 1 3 is 2. Moreover, for < 1, 2 < 2 .Therefore, there always exist a set of q 0 2 [q ;
(1 2q 0 ) < 2: Therefore, for any < 1, there exist a set of q 0 2 [q ;
Proof of Theorem 2:
For the two point distribution (N=2) the discrete polarization measure is
For the alternative N point distribution N = 1 + n the DP index is
) where e 1 = 1 and
)] + :::::::::+
Notice that h 0 ( ) = 0 when = 1+ . Evaluating at the …rst derivative we obtain that h( ) is a strictly increasing for all the > , and a strictly decreasing function for all the < .
We can write the di¤erence in DP in function of h(:) as
We want to show that if
for all e i < 1 2 and, therefore, DP ( ; k)
In principle we should analyze two possible cases: when we split the small group ( 2 1 ) and when we split the largest group ( 2 > 1 ). Since 2 is smaller than 2 , then 2 1 2 , Therefore we need that h(e i ) > h( 2 ) for all e i < 2 1 2 .
Therefore if h( e i ) > h( 2 ) for all e i 1 2 , then h( ) has to be a decreasing function for all Therefore for h being strictly decreasing for all e i 1=2, implies that the DP index has to satisfy property 1 if 1:
In that case the maximum value that e i can take in the limit would be 1 , that is max e i = 1 ".
The value for 2 = (1 1 ). Notice that now e i can not be any value between (0; 1 1 ) , otherwise would violate the assumption that e i < 1 . Therefore, the maximum value for e i is max e i = 1 ". This is problematic because we don't need that h be decreasing for 2 .
Now for each value of 2 ;which means a value for 1 , there is a possible maximum value for e i , which in the limit is 1 . Therefore what we need to show is that h(max
We have to show therefore, that h(max 1 ) > h( 1 ) h( 2 ) in all the range of 2 2 [ Notice that as 2 decreases, then 1 increases, and then the range of possible e i also increases, and therefore in the max e i (that in the limit = 1 ) also increases. Therefore,
If the following inequality
is satis…ed for all ", means that when 2 > 1 , then property 1 is satis…ed. So we look which families of DP ( ; k) measures satis…es this inequality:
i Therefore in order this inequality be satis…ed for all values of " we need that 1. Moreover it would also be true for all e i max e i given that we have shown that h is a decreasing function of . Therefore, DP ( ; k)
Proof of necessity:
By contradiction. We can show that if < 1, then there always exist a distribution of such that the polarization before splitting one group is smaller than the new distribution, that is to say
Consider the case such that the distribution among two groups is composed by 1 and 2 : Then the distribution of N + 1 groups is composed by 1 and e 2 = e 3 = e 4 = ::: = e N +1 = , such that
we want to show that for < 1, there always exist a set of 2 [ ;
Notice that if e 2 = e 3 = e 4 = :::
(1 N 0 ) < N: Therefore, for any < 1, there always exist a set of
Proof of Lemma 1:
Step 1: Suppose there are N groups of any size. Take the biggest one and separate it from the others. Then merge all the other groups into one group. By property 1b the DP measure increases if and only if 1. That is, in the new distribution the index is larger than in the original one if and only if 1. This means that, given any distribution of N groups, we can always …nd another distribution on two groups where the DP index is larger if and only if 1. This does not mean that the new distribution is more polarize as explain above, but that the index is larger.
Step 2: Suppose now that we only have two groups of and (1 ) sizes. The polarization index
It is easy to verify that for any this expression is maximized at 1 = 2 = 0:5; which means that this is a global maximum if 1.
Proof of Theorem 3:
Any three points discrete distribution can be written in the form (x; 1 2x; x) such that x 2 [0;
1 2 ]. Our purpose is to show under what conditions DP is an increasing function of x, the shifted mass from the q group to any other group, DP (x; 1 2x; x) < DP (e x; 1 2e x; e x) for all x < e x.
Therefore the comparison of DP (p; q; p) and DP (p + x; q 2x; p + x): would be the same as the comparison of DP (x 0 ; 1 2x 0 ; x 0 ) and DP (e x; 1 2e x; e x) where x 0 = p and e x = p + x
We can compute DP in this case as
The …rst derivative of DP is
Therefor @DP @x evaluated at = 1 is always positive given that
In addition the partial derivative,
; evaluated at x = 
Evaluating the second derivative at x = 1=3 we obtain
This means that for = 1, then
is an in ‡ection point. However if < 1, then
3 is a maximum and if < 1, then
3 is a maximum, this means that for any ball around x=1/3 then DP ( < 1; k) > DP ( > 1; k) x= 1 3 which also violates property 2.Therefore the only DP measure that satisfy property 3 for any distribution has a parameter = 1:
OPERATIONAL CRITERIA TO DEFINE GENOCIDES.
(1) Authorities'complicity in mass murder must be established. Any persistent, coherent pattern of action by the state and its agents, or by a dominant social group, that brings about the destruction of a people's existence, in whole or in part, within the e¤ective territorial control of a ruling authority is prima facie evidence of that state, or other, authority's responsibility. In situations of civil war (i.e., contested territorial control) either of the contending authorities may be deemed responsible for carrying out, or allowing, such actions. It is calculated using the data of the World Christian Encyclopedia 
